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since injury to person or property is essential to a cause of action for strict
liability, venue may lie in the county where that injury occurs.
Mark T Josephs
Modification of the Privilege Against Adverse Spousal
Testimony: Trammel v. United States
Otis Trammel was indicted for importing heroin into the United States
and for conspiracy to import heroin.' Trammel's wife, Elizabeth, one of
six unindicted co-conspirators, agreed to testify against her husband under
a grant of immunity.2 The government's case against Trammel depended
primarily on her testimony. Prior to trial, Trammel moved to sever his
case from that of his two co-defendants, claiming the privilege of prevent-
ing his wife from testifying against him.3 Denying the motion, the district
court ruled that Elizabeth Trammel could testify to any act she had ob-
served and to any communications made during the marriage in the pres-
ence of a third person, and that only confidential marital communications
with the defendant were privileged and thus inadmissible. 4 Based on the
admission of his wife's adverse testimony, Trammel was found guilty. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction,
holding that the admission of the wife's adverse testimony was not error
because the privilege against adverse spousal testimony did not apply to
the voluntary testimony of a co-conspirator spouse who testified under a
grant of immunity from the government. 5 The United States Supreme
1. Trammel and two co-defendants were charged with violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a),
962(a), 963 (1976) (providing for penalties for importing controlled substances).
2. In August 1975, Elizabeth Trammel flew to Thailand, obtained a quantity of heroin,
and returned to the Philippines. She and her husband then flew to the United States to
distribute the heroin. After a subsequent trip to Thailand to purchase additional heroin,
Elizabeth Trammel was arrested when the heroin was discovered during a routine customs
search. Based on the government's assurance of lenient treatment, she agreed to cooperate
with Drug Enforcement Administration agents. Brief for the United States at 3-4, reprinted
in 11 LAW REPRINTS, CRIMINAL LAW SERIES no. 7, at 29-30 (1979-1980).
3. Trammel's claim was based on the privilege recognized in Hawkins v. United
States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958), which prevented a spouse from giving adverse testimony without
the consent of the defendant spouse. For a discussion of Hawkins, see notes 28-39 infra and
accompanying text.
4. Trammel v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 906, 908, 63 L. Ed. 2d 186, 190 (1980).
5. United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1169 (10th Cir. 1978). The circuit court
reasoned that the governmental right to obtain testimony through the immunity statutes
must be weighed against the competing policy of the privilege of preventing adverse spousal
testimony. Noting that the Supreme Court had announced at least one exception to the
privilege in Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525 (1960) (privilege invalid when one spouse
commits a crime against the other), the court determined that, in cases involving grants of
immunity to a spouse who is a co-conspirator of the party spouse, reason and experience
dictate that the policy behind the testimonial privilege is outweighed by the more compelling
need behind the immunity statutes. 583 F.2d at 1168-70.
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Court granted certiorari. Held, affirmed: The privilege against adverse
spousal testimony is modified so that the witness spouse alone has a privi-
lege to refuse to testify adversely; the witness spouse may be neither com-
pelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying. Trammel v. United States,
100 S. Ct. 906, 63 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1980).
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SPOUSAL
TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE
The precise origins of the privilege against adverse spousal testimony
are obscure.6 In Bent v. Allot, 7 a case decided in the sixteenth century, a
wife had testified on her defendant husband's behalf, but when the plain-
tiff sought to examine the wife, the court gave the defendant spouse the
option of suppressing the wife's previous testimony, thus allowing him the
privilege of preventing any adverse testimony.8 By the 1600s an absolute
rule of disqualification had developed, and the wife was considered incom-
petent to testify either for or against her husband.9 The common law rule
of spousal disqualification arose from the combined operation of two doc-
trines.10 First, an accused was thought to be incompetent to testify on his
own behalf because he had an interest in the outcome and might be
tempted to perjure himself." Secondly, husband and wife were recognized
6. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2227, at 211 (J. McNaugh-
ton rev. ed. 1961). At common law the privilege against adverse spousal testimony was only
one of three husband-wife evidentiary privileges. In addition to the adverse testimony privi-
lege, a spouse was incompetent to testify on behalf of the other spouse, and a spouse could
not testify as to confidential marital communications of the other. See United States v.
Allery, 526 F.2d 1362, 1365 (8th Cir. 1975); 1 S. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 493-94 (16th ed. 1899). See also Comment, The Husband- Wfe Evidentiary Privi-
leges: Is Marriage Really Necessary, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 411, 413 [hereinafter cited as Com-
ment, Husband- Wfe Evidentiary Privileges]. The rule prohibiting a spouse from giving
advantageous testimony was discarded in Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933). See
text accompanying note 15 infra. In Trammel the privilege as to confidential marital com-
munications was not at issue. 100 S. Ct. at 909 n.5, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 191 n.5. Accordingly, the
scope of this Note encompasses only the husband-wife privilege against adverse testimony
by a spouse. For a discussion of the marital confidential communications privilege that
prohibits testimony concerning confidential communications made during marriage, see
Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951) (husband refused to reveal to a federal district
grand jury the location of his wife, and such information was deemed privileged as a pre-
sumptively confidential communication); Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934) (privi-
lege not recognized when communication made in presence of third party or in other
situations when communication obviously not intended to be privileged). See generally C.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 82-90 (1954); Comment, Question-
ing the Marital Privilege: A Medieval Philosophy in a Modern World, 7 CuM. L. REV. 307,
311-14 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Questioning the Marital Privilege]; Comment,
The Husband- W!fe Privileges of Testimonial Non-Disclosure, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 208, 216-30
(1961).
7. 21 Eng. Rep. 50 (Ch. 1580).
8. Id
9. See J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, at 212 (quoting E. COKE, A COMMENTARIE UPON
LITTLETON 6b (1628)).
10. See 2 D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 217, at 618-19 (1978).
11. Distrust of the intelligence of jurors fostered the doctrine of interest disqualification.
See Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1892); 1 S. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 425-28 (14th ed. 1883).
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as one person, the husband being that one, and therefore, the interest dis-
qualification of the husband likewise applied to the wife. 12
The United States Supreme Court recognized the common law rule in
Stein v. Bowman, 13 stating that neither a husband nor a wife could be a
witness for or against the other. The doctrine of interest disqualification
gradually disappeared, 14 however, and in Funk v. United States 5 the
Court removed the barrier restricting a spouse from giving advantageous
testimony on behalf of a defendant spouse. Although the rule against ad-
verse spousal testimony remained intact, after Funk it was no longer
viewed as a rule of absolute disqualification. Rather, it became a privilege
to assert the right to refrain from testifying. 16 Both the defendant spouse
and the witness spouse held the privilege,' 7 and accordingly, a defendant
could prevent his spouse from giving adverse testimony of any kind.' 8
Even testimony concerning occurrences that took place prior to the mar-
riage could be barred, provided a valid marriage existed at the time of
trial. 19 The privilege, however, was subject to exceptions. 20 In the federal
12. See J. MCKELVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 443 (3d ed. 1924). But
see Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933) (abandoning common law rule).
13. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 220-23 (1839); accord, Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254
U.S. 189 (1920) (wife incompetent to testify for the purpose of contradicting particular wit-
nesses); Hendrix v. United States, 219 U.S. 79 (1911) (not error to prevent wife from testify-
ing on husband's behalf in murder trial); Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118 (1893) (wife
incompetent witness and spouse had no obligation to produce her at trial for identification
purposes).
14. See D. LouISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 10, at 619-20.
15. 290 U.S. 371 (1933). Funk sought to have his wife testify on his behalf during his
trial for conspiracy to violate the prohibition law. Recognizing that the disqualification rule
had outlived the reasons for its existence, the Court stated that interest was no longer a basis
of disqualification for either a party or a witness, and modem reason did not support the
policy of disqualifying a wife as a witness on behalf of her husband. Id at 380-81.
16. The federal privilege against adverse spousal testimony applies to federal criminal
litigation. See generally D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 10, at 632, suggesting that
no federal decision recognizes the privilege in a civil context. For a discussion of choice of
law considerations relating to marital privileges, see Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and
Confusion.: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 117-21 (1956); Reese &
Leiwant, Testimonial Privileges and Conflict of Laws, 41 L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 85 (1977);
Seildson, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Rule 501, Klaxon and the Constitution, 5 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 21 (1976); Comment, The Constitutional and Erie Implications for Federal Diversity
Cases of the Privilege Provisions of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 8 LINCOLN L.
REV. 151 (1973).
17. See Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 527-29 (1960); Hawkins v. United States,
358 U.S. 74 (1958). But see 3 S. GARD, JONES ON EVIDENCE § 20:47, at 700 (6th ed. 1972)(privilege is in defendant spouse and witness spouse may claim privilege only on behalf of
defendant spouse). See also D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 10, at 623; J. WIG-
MORE, supra note 6, at 254-56.
18. See D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 10, at 624.
19. Accord, Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953) (no privilege because of sham
marriage); United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1977) (no privilege because com-
mon law marriage not valid under Alaska law); United States v. White, 545 F.2d 1129 (8th
Cir. 1976) (no privilege because Arkansas does not recognize common law marriage);
United States v. Smith, 533 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1976) (privilege does not survive divorce);
see G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 327 (1978); J. WIGMORE, supra
note 6, at 223.
20. See D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 10, at 633-34. Interspousal suits such
as divorce cases are prime examples of instances in which the privilege is not applicable. Id
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courts the privilege could not be claimed in a criminal trial for a crime
against the spouse.2 l In addition, the privilege did not apply to adverse
spousal testimony pertaining to crimes against children of either spouse.22
Fostering domestic peace became the primary rationale for the privi-
lege.2 3 A second factor was a "natural repugnance" against forcing either
spouse to condemn the other.24 Despite these justifications, the privilege
was criticized severely.25 Critics claimed that the rule prevented the pres-
entation of relevant evidence and therefore hindered justice,26 and that
marriage, no longer as important in society as it once had been, did not
deserve the protection.2 7
In 1958 in Hawkins v. United States,28 the Supreme Court reevaluated
the status of the privilege against adverse spousal testimony. In Hawkins
the Court considered whether the privilege should be vested in the witness
spouse alone, thereby enabling the witness spouse to testify voluntarily 29
without the consent of the defendant spouse.30 Noting that modification of
the privilege could not be based on precedent, 31 but would have to depend
on reason and experience, 32 the Court decided not to abandon the com-
mon law rule that prevented a spouse from testifying against the other
The privilege also has been disallowed when the defendant spouse has been granted immu-
nity. See In re Lochiatto, 497 F.2d 803, 805 n.3 (1st Cir. 1974).
21. See D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 10, at 633. A victim could even be
compelled to testify. See Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 527-30 (1960) (privilege
deemed inapplicable in Mann Act prosecution of husband even though both spouses sought
to invoke it). See also Yoder v. United States, 80 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1935) (wife competent
witness against husband in Mann Act prosecution even though she was not the victim).
22. See United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362, 1367 (8th Cir. 1975) (wife allowed to
testify about husband's sexual misconduct with her children).
23. See id. at 1365; United States v. Redstone, 488 F.2d 300, 305 (8th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Armstrong, 476 F.2d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1973).
24. See S. GARD, supra note 17, § 20.47, at 698; J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, at 216-17.
But see Comment, Husband- Wfe Evidentiary Privileges, supra note 6, at 427 (the "inherently
repugnant" rationale may be the product of the courts because no factual studies have been
found that indicate that such a belief is widely held).
25. See generally G. LILLY, supra note 19, at 327; Comment, Questioning the Marital
Privilege, supra note 6, at 318-21; 20 MINN. L. REV. 693 (1936).
26. See, e.g., S. GARD, supra note 17, § 21:1, at 745-46, stating that "ordinarily the
sanctity of confidence must yield to the necessity of getting all the facts, and it is only in a
few rare relationships that the public policy of protecting the relationship overrides the pub-
lic policy of unrestricted inquiry."
27. See generally Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence
Family Relations, 13 MINN. L. REV. 675 (1929).
28. 358 U.S. 74 (1958). Hawkins had been charged with transporting a girl from Arkan-
sas to Oklahoma for immoral purposes in violation of the Mann Act. Over his objection, the
district court allowed Hawkins's wife to testify against him. Id at 74-75.
29. Id at 77.
30. At the time of Hawkins, the witness spouse could testify only if the defendant
spouse did not invoke the privilege to prevent the adverse testimony. See notes 16-18 supra
and accompanying text.
31. 358 U.S. at 76-77. The Court noted that the individual states and foreign jurisdic-
tions had provided limited exceptions and modifications to the rule. Id at 78.
32. The Court found the authority to use reason and experience in interpreting the com-
mon law from Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933), and decided that FED. R. CRIM.
P. 26 confirmed that authority. 358 U.S. at 76-77.
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without the accused spouse's consent. 33 Addressing the issue of voluntary
spousal testimony against the other spouse, the Court reasoned that not all
marital rifts are permanent and that family peace would be no less dis-
rupted by voluntary testimony than by compelled testimony.34 The Court
also considered whether the underlying reason for the privilege, that of
fostering family peace, had been undermined by changing times, and de-
cided that although criticism had been leveled at the rule35 and its exclu-
sionary effect had at times worked an injustice, 36 the privilege and the
policy behind it were still viable.37 The Court recognized that it possessed
the authority to change or modify the privilege, but it nevertheless found
that reason and experience dictated that the privilege remain unchanged.38
The Court, however, carefully left the rule open to modifications that
might become necessary because of a change of circumstances in the fu-
ture. 3
9
The privilege was considered again during the promulgation of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. 40 Proposed rule 50541 would have entitled an ac-
33. 358 U.S. at 79.
34. Id. at 77-78. The Court stated "it is difficult to see how family harmony is less
disturbed by a wife's voluntary testimony against her husband than by her compelled testi-
mony." Id at 77.
35. Id at 76 & n.4.
36. Id at 78.
37. Id at 79.
38. Id at 77-79.
39. Id at 78-79.
40. In 1965 an advisory committee was assigned to develop a uniform code of evidence.
A final draft of the proposed rules was submitted to the Supreme Court in October 1971.
The Federal Rules of Evidence then were promulgated by the Supreme Court in November
1972, and were transmitted to Congress, which enacted Public Law 93-12 to ensure adequate
time for review of the proposals. Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 73 Stat. 9. Prior to
enactment of the rules, which became effective July 1, 1975, substantial changes were made
in some sections. Notably, the 13 proposed rules covering the privilege area were eliminated
in favor of rule 501. Disagreements had arisen as to whether the privilege rules should
redefine privileges or merely codify existing law. Questions were also raised as to whether
the Enabling Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3402, 3771, 3772 (1976); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2075 (1976),
should be utilized in codifying rules of privilege or whether the legislature was the appropri-
ate body to promulgate such rules. Because no agreement could be reached on the 13 spe-
cific rules proposed, Congress chose to enact rule 501. See S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 6-7, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7052-53. For the text of
FED. R. EvID. 501, see note 43 infra.
41. PROP. FED. R. EVID. 505 would have provided:
(a) General rule of privilege. An accused in a criminal proceeding has a
privilege to prevent his spouse from testifying against him.
(b) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the
accused or by the spouse on his behalf. The authority of the spouse to do so is
presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
(c) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule (1) in proceedings in
which one spouse is charged with a crime against the person or property of the
other or of a child of either, or with a crime against the person or property of a
third person committed in the course of committing a crime against the other,
or (2) as to matters occurring prior to the marriage, or (3) in proceedings in
which a spouse is charged with importing an alien for prostitution or other
immoral purpose in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1328, with transporting a female in
interstate commerce for immoral purposes or other offense in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424, or with violation of other similar statutes.
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cused in a criminal proceeding the privilege of preventing his spouse from
testifying adversely to him. Incorporating the Hawkins rule, the proposed
privilege could have been claimed either by the accused or by the spouse
on his behalf.42 Congress edited rule 505 from the final draft of the rules
and, instead, substituted rule 50 143 that allows the courts to interpret com-
mon law privileges "in the light of reason and experience."" By enacting
rule 501, Congress thus indicated that it intended to leave the law of privi-
lege unchanged 45 and to allow for its continued development by the
courts.46 Accordingly, the privilege against adverse spousal testimony re-
42. Id The proposal made no mention of the privilege against the disclosure of confi-
dential marital communications. Therefore, once a party spouse gave his consent to permit
the other spouse to testify, he could not later assert the confidential marital communication
privilege to prevent testimony of that nature.
43. FED. R. EVID. 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings,
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies
the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
44. Id. The Federal Rules of Evidence were designed to promote uniformity of deci-
sions. See S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7051, 7054-55. The "reason and experience" language of rule 501 in fact pro-
moted a lack of uniformity. See Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978); United States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1977); United
States v. King, 73 F.R.D. 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 563 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978).
45. The proposed privilege section of the Federal Rules of Evidence had drawn a great
deal of criticism. See Note, The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.- Of Privileges and the
Division of Rule-Making Power, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1177 (1978). See also S. REP. No. 1277,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 119741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7053 (sug-
gesting that rule 501 was substituted when no agreement could be reached as to specific
privileges and passage of the entire rules package was threatened). In Schwartz, Privileges
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence-A Step Forward?, 38 U. PrrT. L. REV. 79, 80 (1976),
the author noted that the House Judiciary Committee thought that the Supreme Court had
intruded too far into state interests. The committee report stated:
The rationale underlying the proviso is that federal law should not super-
sede that of the States in substantive areas such as privilege absent a compel-
ling reason. The Committee believes that in civil cases in the federal courts
where an element of a claim or defense is not grounded upon a federal ques-
tion, there is no federal interest strong enough to justify departure from State
policy. In addition, the Committee considered that the Court's proposed Arti-
cle V would have promoted forum shopping in some civil actions, depending
upon differences in the privilege law applied as among the State and federal
courts. The Committee's proviso, on the other hand, under which the federal
courts are bound to apply the State's privilege law in actions founded upon a
State-created right or defense, removes the incentive to "shop".
H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
7075, 7082.
46. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7075, 7082; 2 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE: FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE 1532 (1975). See also Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948) (sug-
gesting that rules will emerge slowly when developed on a case by case basis).
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mained subject to the consent of the defendant spouse as it had been after
Hawkins.
I. TRAMMEL V. UNITED STATES
Jn Trammel v. United States the Supreme Court again confronted the
issue of whether an accused could assert the privilege to exclude the volun-
tary testimony of his spouse. Initially, the Court stated that because Con-
gress had adopted rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence that allows
for the common law of privilege to be "interpreted . . .in the light of
reason and experience" 47 the Court had the authority to reconsider the
testimonial privilege in the light of existing conditions. 48 Reevaluating the
Hawkins rule that had retained the privilege in the party spouse,49 the
Court then balanced the justification for the privilege against society's
countervailing right to know all probative evidence that exists. Weighing
the competing factors, 50 the Court noted that, although the testimonial
privilege had ancient roots, support for the doctrine had decreased since
Hawkins.-' The Court emphasized that the number of jurisdictions recog-
nizing the privilege had diminished 52 and that criticism of the rule had
continued.53 The Court found this erosion of state support for the privi-
lege significant because the domestic relations area traditionally has been a
state concern.54 The Court then compared the spousal adverse testimonial
privilege55 with other such privileges 56 and found the spousal privilege to
be much broader because it protected the accused from adverse statements
47. FED. R. EVID. 501. For the text of rule 501, see note 43 supra.
48. 100 S. Ct. at 910-11, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 192-93.
49. 358 U.S. at 77.
50. 100 S. Ct. at 912, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 195. In performing a balancing test, the Court
followed a practice used in previous federal cases. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
233-34 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (established rule should be subject to change only
if new experience undermines its justification or if new insight into undesirable conse-
quences of old rule demand change); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (ex-
emptions to giving testimony grounded on individual interest found to outweigh public
interest in search for the truth).
51. 100 S. Ct. at 909-10, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 190-91.
52. Id at 911-12 & n.9, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 193-94 & n.9. Thirty-one jurisdictions recog-
nized the privilege at the time of Hawkins. Only 24 states still recognize it. Id
53. Id at 912, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 195; accord, Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 27.
54. 100 S. Ct. at 912, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 194; see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975)(validity of durational residency requirements for divorce actions is a domestic relations
area long recognized as a province of the states). See also Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162,
167 (1899) ("the whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and
child, belongs to the laws of the State, and not to the laws of the United States").
55. Before discussing the other privileges, the Court distinguished the privilege against
adverse spousal testimony from the privilege against disclosure of confidential marital com-
munications, stating "[those confidences are privileged under the independent rule protect-
ing confidential marital communications." 100 S. Ct. at 913, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 195; see note 6
supra.
56. The Court examined the privileges that exist between priest and penitent, attorney
and client, and physician and patient. See Callahan, Historical Inquiry into the Priest-Peni-
tent Privilege, 36 JUR. 328 (1976); Comment, The Physician-Patient Privilege, 56 Nw. U.L.
REV. 263 (1961); Comment, The Lawyer-Client Privilege.- Its Application to Corporations, the
Role of Ethics, and Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 235 (1961).
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made even in the presence of third persons and was not limited to confi-
dential communications as were the corresponding privileges in other con-
fidential relationships. Moreover, the Court recognized that not only had
the ancient justifications for the privilege disappeared over the years,57 but
also the modern rationale of preserving marital harmony did not support
the privilege in situations in which one spouse is willing to testify against
the other.5 8 Rather, the privilege is "more likely to frustrate justice than to
foster family peace." 59
Determining that the privilege against adverse spousal testimony as
stated in Hawkins was no longer justified, the Court modified the rule and
placed the privilege with the witness spouse alone.60 According to the
Court, the witness spouse may be neither compelled to testify nor fore-
closed from testifying. 61 The fact that the witness spouse had testified
against her husband under a grant of immunity did not make her testi-
mony involuntary.62
Justice Stewart concurred with the majority. Having been on the Court
when Hawkins was decided, he was in a unique position to evaluate the
circumstances underlying both decisions. Basically agreeing with the ma-
jority, Justice Stewart emphasized, however, that the justifications for the
privilege had already disappeared when the Court decided Hawkins, and
that the Trammel majority merely accepted the same arguments that had
been presented and rejected in that case.63
Trammel is significant because the Court considered the question of the
adverse spousal testimonial privilege on the basis of present day standards
and modified the rule accordingly to reflect current circumstances. Ap-
proximately twenty years before Trammel, Justice Stewart's concurring
opinion in Hawkins had indicated the need for additional data before an
intelligent decision could be rendered,64 particularly emphasizing the need
for uniform rules of evidence. 65 When the Federal Rules of Evidence were
57. 100 S. Ct. at 913, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 196. The Court stated that "[n]owhere in the
common-law world ... is a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate
legal identity." Id; cf. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975) (suggesting that women's
activities have expanded in scope and are no longer limited to family related responsibili-
ties).
58. 100 S. Ct. at 913, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 196. The Court noted that "[w]hen one spouse is
willing to testify against the other. . . there is probably little in the way of marital harmony
for the privilege to preserve." Id But see Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 (1958)
(suggesting that this policy is necessary to foster family peace, and that voluntary testimony
would disturb such harmony no less than compelled testimony).
59. 100 S. Ct. at 913, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 196.
60. Id at 914, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 196.
61. Id
62. Id. In an analogous situation the Court in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,
363-64 (1978), suggested that the basic theory behind plea bargaining implies rejection of the
notion that a plea of guilty made as a result of plea bargaining is involuntary. But see
Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. Cm. L. REV. 3 (1978); Wilson, The Ffth
Amendment and the Guilty Plea: An Incompatible Association, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 545 (1979).
63. See text accompanying notes 28-39 supra.
64. 358 U.S. at 82 n.4 (Stewart, J., concurring).
65. Id
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enacted,66 rule 501 specifically vested the courts with the authority to de-
velop the common law rules of privilege. 67 Rule 501 thus encouraged a
case by case consideration of the privilege doctrines and emphasized the
appropriateness of the use of the courts as the mode of accomplishing re-
evaluation in the light of changing circumstances. 68 This affirmation of
the Court's authority69 in the privilege area was perhaps the needed incen-
tive that prompted the Trammel modification.
70
Although the decision did identify and evaluate a number of competing
factors relating to the adverse spousal testimonial privilege, the Court sum-
marily treated several other factors. First, the Court determined that a
relationship in which one spouse would testify voluntarily against the
other had little harmony to preserve. 71 In so holding the Court overlooked
the suggestion in Hawkins that such discord might be temporary. 72 Addi-
tionally, the Court did not address the possibility that the rule might be
subject to abuse by prosecutorial authorities, thereby bringing the volun-
tary nature of a spouse's testimony into question.
73
The threat of prosecution on a conspiracy charge,74 even an unfounded
one, could conceivably be utilized to persuade the witness spouse to testify.
The voluntariness of testimony obtained under such duress is certainly
66. The enactment of the Federal Rules culminated 13 years of study,' thereby filling the
need for the additional data that Justice Stewart had noted in the concurring opinion in
Hawkins. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7051.
67. FED. R. EvID. 501. For the text of FED. R. EvID. 501, see note 43 supra. The
Court's ability to modify the privileges through its rule-making power and without the ap-
proval of Congress had been foreclosed. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 2(a)(1),
88 Stat. 1948 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976)). Rule 501, however, enables the courts to
develop modifications through case law.
68. See S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 7051, 7053, 7059 (stating that rule 501 should not be viewed as disapproving
any of the specific privileges that had been part of the proposed privilege section, but rather
that privileges should be determined on a case by case basis by the courts).
69. Id Commentators suggest that the proposed rules may reappear as common law
through court decisions. Eg., Schwartz, supra note 45, at 84; see Krupp, Problems of Privi-
lege and Witnesses Under the New Federal Rules of Evidence, 20 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 489, 490
(1976). But see Note, The Husband- Wiffe Testimonial Privilege in the Federal Courts, 59
B.U.L. REV. 894, 916 (1979) (suggesting that Congress's action weighs against judicial deter-
mination of modification of privileges).
70. 100 S. Ct. at 914, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 197. Justice Stewart's concurring suggestion that
Trammel would be of interest to students of psychology is perhaps an indication that factors
other than those stated by the Court are the true reasons for the Court's determination to
modify the privilege at this time.
71. Id. at 913, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 196.
72. 358 U.S. at 77-78.
73. A co-conspirator spouse might be induced to testify to save himself, thus bringing
into question the voluntary nature of such testimony. See generally Hawkins v. United
States, 358 U.S. 74, 82-83 (1958) (Stewart, J., concurring); Comment, Marital Privileges and
the Right to Tesqfy, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 196, 204 (1966) (suggesting that the voluntariness of
a wife's testimony is questionable when a wife might be indicted whether or not she was
suspected of complicity in a crime in a direct effort to obtain her testimony as to her hus-
band's activities).
74. The Brief for the Petitioner suggests that accusing someone of participating in a
conspiracy is a relatively simple matter. Brief for the Petitioner at 12, reprinted in II LAW
REPRINTS, CRIMINAL LAW SERIES no. 7, at 12 (1979-1980).
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subject to question. 75 The Court's statement in Trammel that assurances
of lenient treatment and a grant of immunity did not render Trammel's
wife's testimony involuntary76 poses questions as to the weight that the
statement is to carry in future cases involving the issue of voluntariness.
Because the Court did not state that all testimony elicited under such as-
surances or promises of immunity would be considered voluntary, the cir-
cumstances under which such testimony will be considered voluntary will
have to be defined by future decisions. Although the criteria for determin-
ing the voluntariness of spousal testimony was not adequately examined
by the Court, the Trammel decision to modify the privilege by vesting it
solely in the witness spouse reflected the changing nature of the marital
relationship and served to eliminate many of the inequities that had been
severely criticized throughout the years.
III. CONCLUSION
In Trammel v. United States the Supreme Court modified the privilege
that had enabled an accused to prevent the adverse testimony of his spouse
to the extent that the witness spouse alone now has a privilege to refuse to
testify adversely. The Court first recognized that rule 501 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence gave it the authority to reexamine the foundations of
the privilege in the light of reason and experience. Balancing the modem
justification for the privilege, the fostering of family harmony, against soci-
ety's right to know all relevant evidence, the Court determined that the
preservation of marital harmony did not justify the privilege in situations
when one spouse is willing to testify against the other. Rather, the privi-
lege in such situations would only serve to frustrate justice. Noting the
continued criticism of the privilege, the Court found that reason and expe-
rience dictated modifying the privilege and vesting it only in the witness
spouse, who may be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testi-
fying. Moreover, the Court, without explanation, decided that the adverse
testimony of a spouse under a grant of immunity is not involuntary.
The Trammel decision has the potential for making available relevant
evidence that previously would have been unheard. At the same time, the
marital relationship is still protected because although testimony of a
spouse against a defendant spouse may be voluntarily presented, it cannot
be compelled. Furthermore, the confidential marital communications
privilege remains intact.
Marcia Fisher Pennell
75. See general, Brief for the Amicus Curiae Michigan Bar Association Standing Com-
mittee on Civil Procedure at 18-19, reprinted in 11 LAW REPRINTS, CRIMINAL LAW SERIES
no. 7, at 94-95 (1979-1980) (suggests that in Hawkins the claim that Hawkins's wife testified
voluntarily was questionable because she was subject to the threat of prosecution if she
refused).
76. 100 S. Ct. at 914, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 196.
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